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DATE OF DECISION
The Defendant was found guilty of Criminal Homicide Murder
in the Second Degree, a First Degree Felony, by a jury on the 16th
day of March, 1990.

Defendant was sentenced on the 18th day of

April, 1990, to serve a term in the Utah State Prison of not less
than one (1), nor more than fifteen (15) years for the charge of
Manslaughter, Judge Rodney

Page exercising

his

discretion

to

reduce the charge from Criminal Homicide Murder in the Second
Degree, a First Degree Felony, to Criminal Homicide Manslaughter,
a Second Degree Felony.
The Defendant filed for post conviction relief, requesting
that she be granted an appeal which was received by the Clerk of
the Second Judicial District Court, County of Davis, State of Utah
on

the

18th

day

of April,

1990, along

with

the

Motion

for

Certificate of Probable Cause.
This appeal, was directed to the Utah Court of Appeals by the
Davis County Clerk, through the filing of a Certificate on Appeal
on June 5, 199 0.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 1, 1989, Linda Peterson, the Defendant and her
boyfriend her boyfriend, Michel Bertrand, had been living together
for a number of months in her home located in Layton, Utah.

Mr.

Bertrand had been involved in an angry dispute with his ex-wife
over his rights of visitation with his children that had expanded
2
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The

Defendant

indicated

that

she

and

Mr.

Bertrand

had

discussed the difficulties they were having in their relationship
and had talked about the possibility of him moving out of her
house.

(Tp. 538, line 3)

The Defendant determined that she had

worked hard and deserved a break away from the house without Mr.
Bertrand, whereupon she left a note and called a cab to take her
to an acquaintances house in Sunset, Utah.

(Tp. 539, line 22)

Just prior to the arrival of the cab, Mr. Bertrand awoke and
found the Defendant outside of the house waiting for the cab.
became

angry

that

she

intended

to

leave

the

house,

He

became

physically abusive to the Defendant and this physical struggle
continued as the cab, driven by Jay Sevy, came in response to her
call.

(Tp. 44, line 22)

Mr. Sevy testified that,

"The woman was trying to get away and the guy
was grabbing at her and slapping her.11 (Tp.
45, line 13)
The cabby indicated that the altercation was bad enough that
had he not been picking up the Defendant as a fare and taking her
away from the scene, he would have called a police officer and
reported the assault.

(Tp. 46, line 25)

The cab driver helped

the Defendant with her things into the cab and indicated that,
"Her face looked like it was puffed up, looked
like she had been crying." (Tp. 49, line 10)
and that,
"Her demeanor was hysterical
(Tp. 52, line 10)

and

crying."

The cab driver testified that,
"She had asked her boyfriend
4

to get out."

(Tp. 52, line 13)
It was approximately 11:30 p.m. on September 1st when Mr.
Sevy took the Defendant from her residence in Layton and drove to
the Toponce residence in Sunset.

The Defendant arrived there at

approximately 11:45 p.m. with her dog, some rum and coke, a couple
of beers, some night clothes and a backgammon game.

(Tp. 67, line

20) . The Defendant met Richard Toponce at the residence and they
fixed a drink and set about to playing backgammon.
Approximately

thirty

(30)

minutes

after

arriving

the

Defendant made a phone call to her house and told Mich that she
did not want him there when she got back.
told him to leave the keys on the counter.
Toponce

drank

some

into

the

(Tp. 73, line 11)

She

The Defendant and Mr.

evening, playing

backgammon

and

eventually the encounter led to sexual relations between the two
(2).

(Tp. 77, line 10)
At approximately 3:00 a.m. to 3:30 a.m. on September 2nd, the

Defendant got sick and requested Richard Toponce to call a cab,
which he did.

The cab that picked up the Defendant from the

Toponce at approximately 4:00 a.m. was driven by Mr. Dean Steeley.
He drove the Defendant back to her residence

in Layton.

He

indicated that the Defendant did not talk much in the cab, but
asked him in to the residence to get his check.

(Tp. 103, line

10)
The cab driver entered the residence with the Defendant and
went into the kitchen.

At that time a man came out dressed only

in bikini underwear and asked the cab driver if he was Linda's new
5

fuck,

(Tp. 106, line 19) whereupon Defendant immediately told the

man to leave her house.

(Tp. 107, line 7)

Defendant then went

past him and down the hallway of her residence, whereupon the cab
driver heard a crashing sound, like someone being pushed into the
wall and pictures falling from the wall to the floor.
line 19)

(Tp. 108,

He heard gasping and choking sounds coming from the

hallway and heard a woman's voice cry,
"Don't choke me!11

(Tp. 109, line 5)

The cab driver next saw the Defendant go to the telephone,
just outside the kitchen, in the hallway and call the police,
requesting that they come immediately as she was being attacked
and choked and wanted the man out of the house.
21)

(Tp. 110, line

The Defendant told the police dispatch on the telephone that

she
"did not want to die".

(Tp. 151, line 1)

After the call Mr. Bertrand came back down with his pants on
to the kitchen and asked Mr. Steeley to move his cab, which he
did.

(Tp. Ill, line 23)
When Mr. Steeley came back to the door, he heard a crashing

sound again and screaming.

(Tp. 117, line 24)

He opened the door

and heard Mr. Bertrand yelling obscenities like
"whore", "slut", (Tp. 120, line 8) and "get
her off of me".
Mr. Steeley saw the victim holding the Defendant by her hair and
shirt and hitting her head against the wall near the bottom of the
stairs.

(Tp. 118, line 16)

He indicated that the Defendant broke

6

away and turned to go upstairs whereupon Mr. Bertrand caught her
again near the top of the lower flight of stairs and hit the
Defendant into the door a number of times.

(Tp. 121, line 19)

Mr. Steeley told Mr. Bertrand to let the Defendant go and
said that
"she is trying like a son-of-a-gun to get
away". (Tp. 157, line 8)
Mr. Steeley saw the Defendant go upstairs and Mich go downstairs.
The Defendant then returned to the stairway carrying a small
kitchen knife, leaning over the upper landing of the stairway,
hollering for Mr. Bertrand to get out.

(Tp. 164, line 14)

The Defendant then proceeded down the stairs to approximately
the third step from the bottom and at that time the victim came
around the corner in an upright position,
"like a flash".

(Tp. 166, line 6)

The witness did not see clearly as it was somewhat dark down the
stairway, but he testified that the Defendant did not make any
kind of stabbing motion, overhand or otherwise, and that the knife
was held in front of her.

(Tp. 167, line 11)

After the Defendant and Mr. Bertrand came together, Mr.
Steeley heard Mr. Bertrand say "Oh God, she stabbed me" and the
Defendant saying "now leave", with Mr. Bertrand saying "I cannot
drive",

(Tp. 127, line 7)

whereupon the victim collapsed at the

bottom of the stairs.
Mr. Steeley went down the stairs, noticed the knife at the
feet of the victim, grabbed the knife and carried it to the sink

7

in the kitchen.

He went back to the basement and noticed blood

on the victim's hand and got a cloth and put it in the victim ! s
hand.

When the police officers arrived, Mr. Steeley told them,
"it was in self defense".

(Tp. 131, line 25)

He later told an officer,
"I feel she was acting in self defense. He
was brutally beating on her." (Tp. 194, line
6)
When the police officers arrived they found the victim dead
or dying at the bottom of the stairs and the Defendant in the
garage.

They found blood on the wall of the lower stairwell, just

above the riser of step number two (2) and approximately twenty
inches (20") high.

(Tp. 229, referring to Exhibit "19")

They

also found an indention in the wall behind the door with fresh
plaster dust on the doorknob.
and Exhibit "18")

(Tp. 227, referring to Exhibit

lf

i7"

The Defendant was placed under arrest, put in

a patrol car and taken to the Layton Police Department.
Defendant indicated to any of the officers that asked, that
she had acted in self defense.
action was not intentional.

She told Officer Brown that her

(Tp. 311, line 13)

She was in enough

distress to warrant a check by physicians. The officers suspected
the Defendant was hyperventillating, (Tp. 308, line 16) but in his
concern for physical condition he called the paramedics and she
was taken to the hospital.
Officer Beckett testified that she heard the Defendant tell
a nurse,
"I was beat up, I was beat against the wall,
like slammed, you know", (Tp. 330, line 2)
8

and that her head hurt.

At one point the Defendant said

"Lord, let me die, I took somebody's life,
take me now."
Her effect changed drastically from loud yelling to crying to a
totally subdued mood.
The doctor treated the Defendant for emotional trauma, gave
her

shot

of

Valium

and

checked

her

physically,

finding

no

immediate indication of physical trauma to the Defendant, but
testified that did not mean that she hadn't been thrown up against
the wall or traumatized physically.
Officer Madsen, the booking

(Tp. 325, line 15)
officer,

indicated

that the

Defendant was
"very upset emotionally, she was crying.
Physically her face was quite flushed, her
eyes were red. She was very emotionally upset
and distraught." (Tp. 334, line 7)
Defendant was very cooperative during the booking procedure, but
because of her emotional state at times the booking process had
to be discontinued

for her to calm down.

The Defendant told

Officer Madsen that
"I killed him. I killed my boyfriend. I will
never see him again." (Tp. 335, line 14)
and that she cried most of the time, telling the officer that
"It was not my responsibility."
The Defendant asked the officer what it felt like when the
officer found himself in a position where he had to shoot someone.
(Tp. 339, line 11)

Defendant indicated that her head hurt and she

wanted to go home and go to sleep.
9

(Tp. 341, line 4)

Dr.

Todd

Gray

from

the

State Medical

Examiner's

Office

testified that the victim died of a small knife wound to the
middle of the chest, penetrating the sternum, piercing the heart
and the esophagus. He indicated that it could have been virtually
instantaneous.

Dr. Gray testified that such a wound would have

resulted in a small spurt of blood with the removal of the knife
and the tissues would likely swell and tend to close the opening,
limiting external bleeding.

(Tp. 363, line 23)

He indicated that there were no hilt marks on the victim
which meant that the knife was not forced through the victim hard
enough to result in bruising caused by the handle of the knife.
(Tp. 365, line 12)

Dr. Gray testified that he had examined the

Defendant's clothing, but the majority of the blood stains was on
her sweat pants approximately four inches (4") below the top of
the pants and down mostly on the left side of the front of the
pants.

(Tp. 381, line 22)

There was little or no blood from the

waist band to the top of the sweatshirt.
Dr. Gray admitted that the Defendant's version of the facts
was a reasonable explanation of the delivery of the wound to the
victim.

(Tp. 395, line 9)

That the blood splatter on the wall,

stairs and clothing of the Defendant appeared to be in all the
right places to verify the Defendant's explanation of the events.
(Tp. 41, line 13)

The Dr. indicated that his only concern was

that under Defendant's explanation the victim would likely have
continued

on forward

into the Defendant, causing

some

actual

contact and likely resulting in smeared blood on the Defendant and
10

the victim.

However, he admitted that the relative positioning

of the two (2) people involved with the knife being held by the
Defendant at approximately her strongest point, i.e., center of
gravity,

and with the vertical

element to the motion of the

Defendant, the possibility that the victim may have had

some

reaction to stop his forward momentum may all have had an effect
in keeping the victim from falling over onto the Defendant.
The State f s blood expert, Jim Bell, testified that he had
concerns over the Defendant's version of the facts not resulting
in the victim falling into the Defendant.

However, Mr. Bell had

to admit that the State's version of the facts required

some

fairly fancy footwork on the part of the Defendant to avoid the
victim bleeding on her at a level higher than four inches (4fl)
below the top of her sweat pants, postulating that perhaps the
Defendant had stabbed the victim while he was higher than her on
the stairway and then immediately rushed away from the victim so
that minimum of blood would have sprayed on her.
The Defendant's investigator, Keith Taylor, an Ogden City
Police Officer, testified

as to photographs

that

he took

of

injuries to the Defendant, including a bruise on her right knee,
bruise on her higher left leg, bruise on her right buttock, bruise
on her left upper arm, bruise on her left leg front, bruise on her
chest and bruises to her head.

(Tp. 486, various lines)

Dr.

Berwell, the Defendant's personal physician, testified that he
found the same bruises and gave a description of the size and
location of each of these bruises.
11

(Tp. 517)

The Defendant testified that she did not get the knife with
the intention of using it against the victim, but that she got it
to make certain that the victim did not attack her again.

(Tp.

557, line 14)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

The District Court, at the end of the State's case in

chief, erred in not granting Defendant's Motion for Judgment of
Acquittal, based upon the State's failure at that point in the
Trial to prove that the Defendant did not act in her own self
defense.
2.

The jurys' verdict of guilt to Criminal Homicide Murder

in the Second Degree (First Degree Homicide) was against the clear
weight of the evidence on the issue of self defense and reasonable
minds could not have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL
At the close of the presentation of the State's evidence, the
Defendant, through her attorney, John T. Caine, moved the Court
for a Judgment of Acquittal.

In this Motion it was suggested to

the Court that the State had presented the charge as a Second
Degree Murder and therefore, had to prove one of three (3) factual

12

circumstances outlined by the statute to secure a conviction.

It

was clear that the State did not allege or even intend to show
that this was an intentional killing.

(Tp. 465, line 6)

The State's case hinged on the other two (2) alternatives.
One

being

that

the

Defendant

recklessly,

intending

to

cause

serious bodily harm or other injury, committed an act of homicide,
or that she acted in a way evidencing a depraved indifference to
human life and thereby caused the death of another.
The Court of Appeals has ruled recently in the case of
State v. Harman, 767 P. 2d, 567

(Utah Appellate 1989) that in

reviewing the results of a jury trial,
"we

reverse
only when the evidence
is
sufficiently
inconclusive
or
inherently improbable, that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
the Defendant committed the crime . . . .!l
The Court went on to state that,
"although this a high standard, it is not
insurmountable. We will not make "speculative
leaps across
remaining gaps" in the
evidence .... every element of the crime must
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. If the
evidence does not support those elements the
verdict must fail." (Id at 568)
Defendant argues that as the Motion for Acquittal was before
the Judge and resulted in a judicial decision, that this Court
should use the standard of review discussed in the Utah State
Supreme Court decision of State v. Goodman, 763, P.2d 786 (Utah
1988) , where the standard was that the decision of the Trial Court
must be sustained unless it is
"against the clear weight of the evidence or
if the Appellate Court otherwise reaches a
13

definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made."
and later states that
"in reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency
of the evidence, we require that the weight
of the evidence; discounting questions of
credibility and demeanor not oppose the
verdict." (Id at 786-87)
Defendant recognizes that the verdict was rendered by a jury
in the present case.

However, because of the Motion to Dismiss,

this Court has the opportunity to review the decision making
process of the Judge in this case and alleges that the evidence
presented by the close of the State's case simply did not rise to
the level required for a conviction of Second Degree Murder.
There

were

three

(3) eyewitnesses

resulted in Mr. Bertrand's death.

to

the

actions

which

That being the victim, who of

course was not able to testify in this Trial, although his actions
prior to the time of death spoke clearly as to his emotional state
and intentions prior to the actions which resulted in his death;
the Defendant, who at the time of the defense Motion for Acquittal
had not had the opportunity to testify; and finally, the cab
driver, Mr. Steeley, who made it absolutely clear to everyone who
listened, that he had witnessed the entire event and testified to
a set of facts that clearly pointed to an act of self defense on
the part of the Defendant.
The State's experts also testified that the evidence they
analyzed was consistent with the observations made of the events
by the eyewitness and subsequently by the Defendant and could only

14

point to a single factor that they found troubling in reviewing
the events outlined by the defense's position.

This factor was

doggedly held to by the State throughout the course of the
investigation and the Trial.
The State's experts were called to say that if the victim had
come around the corner of the basement and up the stairs,
essentially running into the Defendant, that the force or momentum
of his moving body would have forced the body, after being
stabbed, to come into contact with the Defendant, smearing the
blood on her sweatpants that she was wearing.
However,

the

State's Medical

Examiner,

Dr. Todd

Gray,

admitted during cross-examination that there were a number of
potential factors involved in what effect the relative forces the
knife and the two (2) individuals acting out the event would have
had on the end result.
Dr. Gray admitted that the positioning of the knife as
testified by cab driver, Dean Steeley, as being held by the
Defendant in both hands in front of her at approximately belly
button level or below, placed the knife in the most stable
position for her torso, basically at her center of gravity.

(Tp.

401, line 19) Dr. Gray also admitted that the resulting force on
the victim of the knife, pushing it at approximately the level of
his sternum, was a position of far less stability on the victim,
agreeing with the proposition that it is easier to push a person
away when the force is applied at the top of the person, than it
is to push a person away from forces applied at the middle.
15

(Tp.

401, line 25)
Dr. Gray also reviewed the possibility that the Defendant's
reflex action to push the victim away from her may have had some
effect on the force applied at the end of the knife.
line 12)

(Tp. 402,

The Doctor further agreed that the force or momentum of

the victim was somewhat dissipated in his rising up the steps,
stating that
"there is a vertical component to the motion.11
(Tp. 403, line 4)
Dr. Gray also testified as to the mistaken assumption being
made by the State in espousing what the State considered to be
this problem of no smeared blood on the Defendant and that is that
"it assumes the body tripped or has fallen,
went in a forward motion."
(Tp. 4 05, line
11)
The evidence presented by the eyewitness was that the victim
did not immediately lose muscular control upon being stabbed.

In

fact his testimony was that the victim stood in place for a moment
of time and made a number of comments before falling backwards
down the last two (2) stairs, where he was found by the police in
the appropriate position for having been stabbed and dying on the
second

step

of

the

lower

stairwell

as

described

by

the

eyewitnesses.
The State wanted very badly to leave the impression with the
jury that the Defendant was somehow below the victim at the time
the stabbing took place and that the victim was stabbed by the
Defendant, using a strong overhand stabbing motion as is seen in

16

the movies, such as "Psycho".
The

myriad

of

inconsistencies

in

this

scenario

so

far

outweigh the alleged concern with the defense version as to make
it utterly unbelievable.

First of all the scenario is in direct

conflict with the eyewitness testimony, also, the blood pattern
found on the clothing worn by the Defendant, as well as the blood
found on the wall and steps at the second step and below could not
have occurred under the State's scenario.

Mr. Bell attempted to

make

blood

it

sound

possible

regarding

the

found

on

the

Defendant's clothing by stating that she could have somehow run
up to the victim and stabbed him with an overhand motion with the
victim above her on the stairway and then somehow, with her short
5'0" frame, pull the knife out of the wound and through an act of
gymnastics, jump almost clear of the resulting arterial spurting
blood that would then miraculously not fall on her hand, arm,
chest or abdomen, but only land on her sweatpants, approximately
four inches (4") below the top and down her leg.
Although the State's witness could not give an particular
indication as to why the Defendant would want to go to this
trouble, it is rather unlikely that her actions were taken in the
heat of such a moment, leaving her with the mental acuity to jump
away from the victim at just the right angle to make the blood
spots on herself coincide exactly with what would become the
defense's scenario of the events.

This is not to mention the

difficulty the State would have in trying to show how if the
victim was stabbed near the top of the lower landing of the
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stairs, with the Defendant below him, how he managed to bleed only
on the bottom two

(2) stairs of that stairwell while walking

mortally wounded all the way down the lower half of the stairs,
reaching the bottom in time to turn around and fall on his back.
Curiously the State did not really attempt to describe that
scenario in any detail to the Court or to the jury, recognizing
that it simply did not hold up under the physical evidence that
was found at the scene, not to mention the eyewitness testimony.
The most incredible fact of all in support the defensef s
version of this event was demonstrated to Dr. Gray during his
cross-examination, using the model of the stairs presented into
evidence

by

the

defense

with

the

Defendant

standing

at

approximately the third step of the model and defense attorney,
Allen, who as indicated was the same height as the victim in this
case, walked around the corner and up the stairs and into the
Defendant.

That

demonstrated

to

action

as

described

Dr. Gray, the

by

in-court

the

eyewitness

demonstration

by

and
the

defense, placed the knife in exactly the position on the victim
as where the fatal wound actually occurred.

(Tp. 387, line 19)

Cleeirly the sheer weight of the physical evidence opposed the
scenario proposed by the State and places the Defendant in a
position where the actual stabbing was either an act of clear self
defense, fending of the advance of the victim or very probably,
an

accidental

Defendant.

act

intended

neither

by

the

victim,

nor

the

The defense's position at Trial was that procuring the

knife by the Defendant was an act of self defense and that the
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actual stabbing was a result of an accidental collision of the
Defendant and the victim.
The State not only failed beyond a reasonable doubt to rebut
this scenario, but in fact the defense proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that this was the actual set of events that resulted in the
death of Michel Bertrand.
The case of State v. Smith, 675 P.2d, 521 @ Pg. 524 (Utah
1983) as referred to in the Utah Court of Appeals decision in
State of Utah v. Strieby, 790 P.2d 98, (Utah Appeals 1990) held
that
"the State is required to show some evidence
of every element of its cause of action, or
a lesser included offense, to avoid an
unfavorable directed verdict at the close of
its case in chief."
The Court went on to say that
"however the State is not required to prove
a dearth of self defense as one of those
elements."
Quoting Utah Supreme Court case of State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d, 211
@ Pg. 214 (Utah 1985) where the Supreme Court ruled that
"absence of self defense is not one of the
prima facia elements of homicide."
In the Strieby case the Court found that the State did meet
its burden set forth in prima facia case.

However, that case

differed drastically from the present case, in that the Court in
Strieby had not been given the Defendants version of the facts
prior to the defense raising the element of self defense in its
own portion of the case.
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In the present case however, the State ! s

own witnesses,

through the eyewitness testimony of the two (2) cab drivers and
the testimony of Dr. Gray commenting on the in-court demonstration
presented by the defense, clearly set forth the elements of self
defense in the course of the State's case in chief.

Therefore,

it was not simply a matter for the State to present its elements
and wait for the defense to bring up the issue of self defense,
but in fact the issue of self defense was inherent in the case in
chief presented by the State.
The factual presentation of evidence by the State in the
present case does allow the defense to raise the case of
State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d, 211 (Utah 1985) on self defense in its
argument that the Judge erred in not directing an acquittal after
the State's case

in chief.

The Knoll

case as described

in

Appellant's Brief in the Strieby case is controlling regarding the
State's proof requirements in a case of self defense and makes it
clear that once the issue is raised, it is the prosecutions burden
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the actions were not made
in self defense.
"A Defendant is not required to establish a
defense of self defense beyond a reasonable
doubt or even by a preponderance of the
evidence
In some, where there is a basis
in the evidence where the evidence is produced
by the prosecution of by the Defendant which
would provide some reasonable basis for the
jury to conclude that a killing was done to
protect the Defendant from an eminent threat
of death by another an instruction on self
defense should be given the jury; and if the
issue is raised, whether by the Defendant's
or prosecution's evidence, the prosecution
has the burden of proof, beyond a reasonable

doubt, that the killing was not in self
defense.11
(.Id at 214) (Emphasis added as
quoted in Appellant's Brief in the case of
State v. Strieby)
In the present case the State could not allege that the
victim was incapable of inflicting violence against the Defendant
or

that

such

Bertrandfs

an

action

ex-wife,

was

Carolyn

even

against

Zamora,

his

testified

nature.
that

on

Mr.
prior

occasions Mr. Bertrand had become extremely angry with her and had
acted out that anger by hitting her.

(Tp. 40, line 6)

More

recently, Mr. Bertrand had become so angry with his ex-wife that
he had kicked in the rear fender of her vehicle.

(Tp. 36, line

1)
Ms.

Zamora

further

stated

that

Mr.

Bertrand

could

be

extremely angry and abusive over issues that involved his children
and that she had been forced to allow visitation after refusing
it to the victim for over two (2) months.

She testified that her

attorney had told her that on the 1st day of September she would
have to allow visitation.

Ms. Zamora testified that she was

supposed to be home with the children for Mr. Bertrand to pick up
at 7:00, but by the time she actually arrived home at 7:25, she
found that Mr. Bertrand had been there and left and that when he
returned to pick up the children, only his daughter, Tiffany,
wanted to go with him.

(Tp. 28, line 3-11)

This course of events and the fact that the victim had been
drinking (toxicology report indicated he had a blood alcohol level
of .09 at the time of death) provide plenty of reasons for the
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victim to be in a less than agreeable mood.
The State

in the present case was

faced with

a

factual

situation that made it clear or at least as clear as can be
expected in such a case, as to the events leading up to the death
of the victim and the manner in which he died.

This scenario of

the death of Michel Bertrand provided little or no evidence upon
which the State could carry

its burden of proof

to show the

Defendant was guilty of Second Degree Murder, nor did the State
carry its required burden of proof on the issue of self defense.
The Trial Court f s refusal to enter an acquittal on the charge
of Second Degree Murder at the end of the State's case in chief
was

against

the

clear weight

of

the

evidence

and

should

be

reversed.

POINT II
THE JURYS 1 VERDICT OF GUILT WAS RENDERED
WHERE THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENTLY
INCLUSIVE THAT REASONABLE PERSONS MUST
HAVE MAINTAINED A REASONABLE DOUBT
The

ground

rules

for

reviewing

Appellate* Court is well established.

a

jury

verdict

in

the

The Rule is clear that the

evidence in a case under review must be examined in a light most
favorable to the jurys 1 verdict.

(See State v. Harman, Id at 568)

As discussed previously in this Brief, this Court however,
has made it clear in the Harman case that
"although this is a high standard, it is not
insurmountable. We will not make speculative
leaps across remaining gaps in the evidence.
Every element of the crime charged must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
If the
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evidence does not support those elements the
verdict must fail." (id at 568)
This passage from the Harman case is quoted again under this
argument of Defendant's appeal because of its importance to the
defense f s second argument.
The Defendant maintained at Trial and continues to allege in
this appeal that her procurement of the knife on the early morning
hours of September 2, 1989 was an action taken in her own self
defense and further was an action completely justified by the
events of that morning and the previous evening.
It is important at this juncture to capsulize the abuse that
the Defendant had been forced to endure during the period of time
prior to the tragic death of Michel Bertrand.

The evidence of the

prior abuse is clearly corroborated by a number of different and
independent witnesses and virtually unrebutted by the State.
The Defendant testified that when she had determined that she
had put in enough work at home and wanted to go out on her own in
the evening, that she quietly called a cab and sat out in front
of the house waiting for the cab to arrive.

She testified that

when Mr. Bertrand awoke and found that she was intending to leave
he became upset, angry and physically abusive.
The

Defendant

testified

that

Mr.

Bertrand

slapped

her,

grabbed her and shook her around and that she was very scared by
his behavior.

(Tp. 542, line 20)

The fact that he had not really

been physically abusive to her previously made this conduct all
the more shocking to her.

The Defendant also testified that this
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physical abuse continued until the cab driver got out of his car
in front of her house.

Mr. Jay Sevy, the cab driver who arrived

that night, clearly corroborated this testimony.

The cab driver

testified that in his opinion the abuse was bad enough that had
he not been personally taking the Defendant from the scene, he
would have referred the matter to the police.
Mr. Sevy further testified he heard the Defendant say that
she had told her boyfriend to get out of her house.
first

of many

corroborated

statements

made

by

This was the
the

Defendant

requesting that Mr. Bertrand leave her house permanently.
Shortly after the Defendant arrived at the Toponce residence
she

was

heard,

as

testified

to

by

Richard

Toponce,

on

the

telephone specifically telling Mr. Bertrand that he was to pack
his things and get out of her house and leave his keys on the
counter, indicating that she was extremely upset by the physical
altercation at her house and that she no longer wanted to maintain
a relationship with Mr. Bertrand, at least not with him living in
her residence.
The
residence

State

attempted

to place

the events

at

in the most negative light possible.

the

Toponce

However, the

actions of the Defendant there are extremely revealing.

First of

all, the Defendant does not return to her house for a matter of
three

(3) to four

(4) hours after the telephone

call to Mr.

Bertrand, leaving the victim plenty of time to leave her residence
without having to come into actual physical contact with him.
During the course of the Defendant's stay with Richard Toponce she
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attempts to calm herself by drinking alcoholic beverages
playing backgammon.
they had

sexual

and

At a later time, as the Defendant testified,

relations, which

could be

interpreted

as an

attempt to seek comfort after the breakup of her relationship with
Mr. Bertrand.
The Defendant then decides to return to her residence and
feeling concerned

about whether or not Bertrand has left her

residence, asks the cab driver to assist her with her things and
has him walk to the kitchen with her.

At that time the second

episode of physical and emotional abuse occurs.

Mr. Bertrand

shows his State of mind clearly with his opening comment regarding
the cab driver who

is sitting at kitchen counter.

When the

Defendant attempts to walk away from Mr. Bertrand, he follows her
down the hall and according to the Defendant, slams her up against
the wall, knocking the pictures from the wall to the floor and
puts his arm around her neck choking her.

This is verified by the

testimony of the eyewitness who says that he hears the slam, the
pictures falling, heard the Defendant gasping and gurgling and
heard comments from her requesting that Mr. Bertrand stop choking
her.
The physical evidence is also corroborated of this event as
the pictures are in fact found by the police, having fallen from
their places on the wall and the victim is found to have a strong
bite

mark

in

a

location

that,

according

to

Dr.

Gray,

consistent with his arm around the neck of the Defendant.

was
The

Defendant at this time does not immediately rush for some type of
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weapon in an attempt to injure the victim, which might have been
the case if her motive was violence or revenge as the State seemed
to imply, but in fact the Defendant goes straight to the telephone
and dials the police, requesting their immediate assistance in
getting Mr. Bertrand out of her house.

This is now the third

corroborative demand by the Defendant for Mr. Bertrand to leave
her residence.
The

Defendant

also

informs

dispatch

that

she

has

been

assaulted and choked and that she was afraid for her life.

This

call was corroborated both by Mr. Seeley, the eyewitness, and also
by the tape recording made at the Layton City Dispatch.

At this

point Mr. Bertrand appears to be acquiescing in the Defendant's
demands to leave the residence and sends the cab driver out of the
house ostensibly to move his car.
By the time the eyewitness returns to the house he finds that
Mr. Bertrand not only has not gotten in the truck to leave, but
in fact has again grabbed onto the Defendant by the hair and shirt
and is smacking her into the side wall at the bottom landing of
the stairway.

He indicates that the Defendant breaks away from

the grasp and runs to the top of the stairs where she is again
grabbed by Mr. Bertrand and slammed into the front door.
The jury did not have to take the Defendant's word for this
occurrence or even the corroboration of the eyewitness testimony,
but was shown verification of this particular act of violence by
photographs of the door handle showing a clear indention into the
wall behind the door with plaster dust all over the door handle.
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When the Defendant finally breaks the victim's grasp at the
urging of the witness, Steeley, she has now been physically
assaulted
occasions.

by

Mr.

Bertrand

on

four

(4)

distinct, separate-

Four (4) acts of specific violence perpetrated upon

the Defendant by Michel Bertrand.
Also during this time the Defendant has attempted on at least
three (3) occasions to get Mr. Bertrand to leave her residence and
leave her alone, including a desperate call to the Layton City
Police Department.

The Defendant is eminently justified at this

point in time in gaining for herself some protection against
further physical violence and to this end, she goes to the kitchen
and gets a paring knife from the butcher block.

The Defendant

then returns to the stairwell and leans over the upper stair rail
and again yells "get out".
Not seeing Mr. Bertrand and not knowing what he is up to, the
Defendant walks down the stairs, stopping at the third or second
step from the bottom. To this point in time, the jury has not had
to depend upon the mere testimony of the Defendant to believe the
facts related.

Every event is specifically corroborated by

eyewitness testimony and physical evidence. There is not a single
piece of evidence as here related that did not carry the weight
of physical or eyewitness verification.
At this point the Defendant testified that she did not know
for sure where Mr. Bertrand was, but that she was holding the
knife directly in front of her in a defensive posture, in a way
she felt Mr. Bertrand would clearly see that she was not going to
27

allow him to cause her any further physical injury.

She is also

calling out "get out" so that Mr, Bertrand has no excuse for not
knowing her desire.
The Defendant states that at this time Mr. Bertrand comes
around the* corner and up the stairway at her.
he came at her at a rapid rate.

She testified that

Mr. Steeley testified that the

victim looked like a "flash" coming around the corner from the
family room of the house.

He bounded up one (1) or two (2) steps

to the point where, as the physical evidence and demonstration of
the defense showed, the knife came directly into contact with the
victim at his chest.

Mr. Bertrand was stabbed one (1) time

through the sternum, piercing the heart. A single mortal wound.
The Statefs only attempt to contradict any of this evidence
as stated previously was there contention that if the victim had
come at the Defendant fast enough to become impaled upon the
knife, that he would have had to have collided with the Defendant.
The State's theory is analogous to the difficulty we might
have in believing that we could be killed in an automobile
accident, striking something when we were only going 2 0 mph. The
laws of physics show however, that that accident can indeed be
fatal if the object we strike has momentum of its own compounding
the rate of force.
It is extremely likely that as the victim came around the
corner, surprising the Defendant, that she may have reacted by
reflex as discussed with Dr. Gray by pushing the victim away.
Unfortunately this push was made by a hand that contained a sharp
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paring knife.

The combination of the force caused a fatal wound

to be inflicted upon Mr. Bertrand.
Again, the jury did not have to take the Defendant's own
testimony as the only evidence of this event.
clearly

corroborated

by the

eyewitness

The evidence was

testimony

of

the

cab

driver, Dean Steeley, and to a substantial degree was corroborated
by the physical evidence.

The blood stains on the Defendant's

clothes were only found below her waist, except for one (1) odd
drop of blood that wound up on her shoulder.
blood was never tested to verify whose blood

This odd drop of
it was and the

testimony clearly indicated that the Defendant had a cut behind
her ear that bled and could have well been the cause for that one
(1) drop of blood.
The Defendant did not have blood on her sleeves or arms to
any extent, clearly indicating that her arms and sleeves were at
a level equal or higher than the wound suffered by Mr. Bertrand.
The blood on the stairs and stair walls clearly indicate that the
victim could not have been higher than on the first or second step
from the bottom of the stairs at the time the wound was inflicted.
The body was found lying on its back at the bottom of the stairs,
which is the most natural resting place imaginable based upon the
defense's scenario of the events.

Finally, the wound lines up

perfectly with the knife held by the Defendant in the way she
testified as demonstrated to Dr. Gray.

All of these events are

clearly corroborated by the physical evidence and could not have
been coincidental or invented by the Defendant.
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This explanation of the events of the night of September 1st
and the morning of September 2nd clearly do not give the State any
evidence, much less evidence that reaches the level of proving a
case beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed any
of

the

possible

elements

of

Second

Degree

Murder

or

of

Manslaughter.
The Judge in this case gave a confusing Jury

Instruction

regarding circumstantial evidence and what the jury was to do
under circumstances where two (2) possible scenarios were equally
as likely.

The Rule of the law has been that the Defendant is

entitled to the jurys 1 belief in the Defendant's scenario of the
events under that type of circumstantial case.
The present case is extremely analogous to the case of
State v. Strieby, although there are some specific differences.
One difference is the fact that the present case was tried before
a jury, whereas the Strieby case was tried before a Judge.

The

Court took cognizance of the fact that the Appellate Court could
use a little different standard in a Judge Trial than was required
in a Trial before a jury and Defendant

is cognizant of that

difference.
However,

the

present

case

has

some

substantial

factual

advantages over the Strieby case in that all of the important
testimony

of

the

Defendant

is

independent eyewitness testimony.

verified

by

competent

and

In this case the Court would

not only have to "make speculative leaps11 across gaps in the
evidence.

(State v. Harman)

But, in addition, the Court has to
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at the same time climb over and ignore a great wall of evidence
provided by eyewitness testimony and the physical evidence left
at the scene to come to the conclusion that the State had proven
the elements of the crime charged against the Defendant beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The State also failed to meet its burden identified in the
case of State v. Knoll, 712 P. 2d, 214 and again referred to by the
Court in Strieby.

The State has to prove the absence of self

defense after it is properly raised.

In fact the Defendant in

this case carries the burden to "establish a defense of self
defense beyond a reasonable doubt or even by a preponderance of
the evidence".
The only attempt made by the State to disprove the defense's
allegations of self defense was testimony from the police officers
that the Defendant did not appear physically damaged enough.

The

State's expert in this area, Dr. Condie, however, made it clear
that the fact that there weren't immediately discernable cuts and
bruises on the Defendant did not mean that she had not been
traumatized.

People vary in their reaction to physical trauma.

Some people bruise easily, other people don't.

The Defendant

presented corroborating evidence from Keith Taylor, as well as Dr.
Berwald to

indicate that the Defendant did have a number of

bruises and marks on her body following the events of September
2nd.
However, it is not the State's position to determine how much
of a beating a person has to put up with before that person can
31

take action to defend herself.

Unlike the Strieby case, the

Defendant did not go up and grab a gun, which was clearly an
offensive weapon that could be used to inflict mortal injury from
a great distance away.

The Defendant procured a small to middle

sized knife from her kitchen and held it close to her body in a
strictly defensive measure to keep Michel Bertrand from assaulting
her physically again.
The evidence in Strieby clearly showed that the Defendant
fired the weapon at the victim, knowing that her actions would
result in death or serious bodily injury to the victim.
In the present case the State could not even clear that
burden, as the evidence tended to show and verify the Defendant's
contention that the actual stabbing was accidental or at the most,
reflexive.
Instead of presenting strong evidence in support of a case,
the State attempted to portray an attitude or image of badness in
the Defendant by having the police officers indicate that the
Defendant showed no remorse after the death.

This tactic must

have been successful in light of the jurys 1 verdict.

However, it

is not appropriate evidence to support the actual event.

People

react to stress and shock in different ways and even the police
officers, who on the stand, attempted to say that the Defendant
showed no remorse or emotion regarding the events that had just
occurred, had

to admit on cross-examination

indicated quite to the contrary, very

that the

reports

often showing that the

Defendant was grossly remorseful and extremely shaken and upset
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by the events.
In addition, the Defendant's extemporaneous statements to
these officers always included a reference to her action being
unintentional and in self defense, putting into words the clear
presumption of innocence that the Defendant was entitled to and
which presumption the State never overcame.
This

Court's

closing

comment

in

the

Strieby

decision

regarding the Judge's guilty verdict is equally applicable to this
case in that the jurys1 verdict is "contrary to the clear weight
of the evidence and as a result, that the State failed to prove
the elements of Manslaughter

(or Murder in the Second Decree)

beyond a reasonable doubt."
CONCLUSION
The District Court, at the end of the State's case in chief,
erred

in

not

granting

Defendant's

Motion

for

Judgment

of

Acquittal, based upon the State's failure at that point in the
Trial to prove that the Defendant did not act in her own self
defense and the jurys1 verdict of guilt to Criminal

Homicide

Murder in the Second Degree (First Degree Felony) was against the
clear weight of the evidence on the issue of self defense and
reasonable minds could not have found giy^Lt beyond a reasonable
doubt.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this\28th dSktofI December, .1990.

Attorney for Defendant
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1986

CHAPTER 3
DISTRICT COURTS
Section
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed.
78-3-3.
Term of judges — Vacancy.
78-3-4.
Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to circuit court — Appeals.
78-3-5.
Repealed.
78-3-6.
Terms — Minimum of once quarterly
78-3-7 to 78-3-11. Repealed.
78-3-11.5.
State District Court Administrative System — Primary and secondary county
locations.
78-3-12.
Repealed
78-3-12.5.
Costs of system.
78-3-13.
Repealed.
78-3-13.4.
Counties joining court system — Procedure — Facilities — Salaries.
78-3-13.5, 78-3-14. Repealed.
78-3-14.5.
Allocation of district court fees and
fines
78-3-15, 78-3-16. Repealed.
78-3-16.5.
Fees for filing and other services or actions.
78-3-17.
Repealed.
78-3-17.5.
Application of savings accruing to counties.
78-3-18.
Judicial Administration Act — Short title.
78-3-19.
Purpose of act.
78-3-20.
Definitions.
78-3-21.
Judicial Council — Creation — Members — Terms and election — Responsibilities — Reports.
78-3-22.
Presiding officer — Compensation —
Duties.
78-3-23.
Administrator of the courts — Appointment — Qualifications — Salary.
78-3-24.
Court administrator — Powers, duties,
and responsibilities.
78-3-25.
Assistants for administrator of the
courts — Appointment of trial court
executives.
78-3-26.
Courts to provide information and statistical data to administrator of the
courts.
78-3-27.
Annual judicial conference.
78-3-28.
Repealed.
78-3-29.
Presiding judge — Election — Term —
Compensation — Powers — Duties.
78-3-30.
Duties of the clerk of the district court.
78-3-31.
Court commissioners — Qualifications
— Appointment — Functions governed by rule.
78-3-1 to 78-3-2.

Repealed.

1971,1981, 1988

78-3-3. T e r m of j u d g e s — V a c a n c y .
Judges of the district courts shall be appointed initially until the first general election held more than
three years after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office for judges of the
district courts is six years, and commences on the
first Monday in J a n u a r y , next following the date of
election A judge whose term expires may serve, upon
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is
appointed and qualified.
1988
78-3-4.

J u r i s d i c t i o n — T r a n s f e r of c a s e s to circuit c o u r t — A p p e a l s .
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all

